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Eulogizing the Line Item Veto Act:
Clinton v. City ofNew York
and the Wisdom of
Presidential Legislating
BY AARON D. ZIBART"
he Supreme Court caused little surprise when it declaredTthe Line Item Veto Act of 1996 unconstitutional.' Although the
majority expressed "no opinion about the wisdom"2 of the
Line Item Veto Act, and one dissent conceded the Act is a "novel"
approach to alleviating federal budgetary woes,3 few commentators have
inquired into the premise underlying the line item veto. This unarticulated
premise, namely that the President stands in a better position than
Congress to make difficult budgetary decisions, merits examination
because of its apparent popularity and likelihood of reemergence in future
legislation.
Part I of tins Note examines the opinions m Clinton v. City of New
York, as well as the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 itself.' Part H presents
some of the arguments advanced by supporters of presidential item veto
authority and, conversely, the responses from opponents.5 Part III briefly
contrasts the character of the modem presidency with that of Congress as
a means ofscrtimzng the rationale behindthe line item veto.6 Finally, this
Note concludes that the view favoring presidential item veto authority is
inherently flawed, because the President is no less insulated than Congress
from the causes of fiscal mismanagement.7
J.D. expected 2000, Umversity of Kentucky.
See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
2 Id. at 2094.
3See id. at 2131 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4 See infra notes 8-48 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 49-89 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 90-114 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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I. THE LINE ITEM VETO ACT UNDER FIRE:
CLINTON V CITY OF NEW YORK
A. Overview of the Line Item Veto Act
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 ("Act") was the culmination of
bipartisan efforts to create legislation widely perceived as necessary for
gaming control over the then-growing federal budget deficit.8 Although
congressional support for the Act was not universal (some congressional
leaders held strong reservations about its constitutionality),9 the Act's
passage in an election year was unremarkable. Certainly, the spectre of a
budget deficit was a concern to most Americans during the mid-1990s.
Even the least astute politician recogmzed the political capital to be gained
by appearing aggressive on this issue.
The Act itself is straightforward. The President is vested with the
expansive authority to "cancel in whole--(l) any dollar amount of
discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3)
any limited tax benefit."'0 In furtherance of the purposes of the Act, the
President must "determine[ ] that such cancellation will-(i) reduce the
Federal budget deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions;
and (iii) not harm the national interest."" Apparently to ensure'that the
President's cancellations are well-informed, the Act also requires the
President to "(1) considerthe legislative history, construction, andpurposes
of the law which contains such dollar amounts, items, or benefits; (2)
consider any specific sources of information referenced in such law or, m
the absence of specific sources of information, the best available
information." 12 The President must notify Congress of any cancellations
within five days.' 3
Interestingly, the President signs the bill or joint resolution into law
before canceling any items of direct spending or taxation. 4 The Act is
distinct, therefore, from the President's prescribed constitutional authority
8 See H.R. CoNF REP No. 104-491 (1996); S. REP. NO. 104-9 (1996).
9 See H.R. CoNF REP. No. 104-11, pt. 2, at 33-35 (1995) (expressing concern
that the President would, in effect, control Congress's spending power unless a
majority objected).
10 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (Supp. Im 1997).
" Id. § 691(a)(A).
121d. § 691(b).
13 See id. § 691(a)(B).
14 See id. § 691(a).
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to veto an "Order, Resolution, or Vote"'15 presented to him or her for
approval. The President does not return an appropriations bill to Congress
in toto, but rather in disembodied pieces. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Clinton v. City ofNew York, as explained below, was based primarily on
this perceived variation from the constitutionally prescribed method of
legislating.
Upon receivingnotice of the cancellations, Congress may simply allow
them to stand. Alternatively, Congress may "disapprove" them by means
of a disapproval bill sent to the President. 16 As with any legislation, the
President can then veto the disapproval bill, requiring the standard two-
thirds majority vote of both houses to override. This procedure is therefore
analogous to the manner m which Congress votes to overturn a presidential
veto of an entire bill.'7 As such, the Act is not an altogether unique idea, but
an attempt to fashion a modified approach to presidential review of
congressional legislation. Significantly, the Act enables the President to
cancel not only amounts contained m bills or joint resolutions, but also
"any dollar amount represented separately in any table, chart, or explana-
tory text included in the statement ofmanagers orthe governing committee
report accompanying such law "I' The President's ability to cancel items
is directly proportional to the specificity of the congressional committee
reports.'
9
B. Setting the Stage: Challenge ofClinton v City of New York
The Supreme Court avoided reaching the merits in an earlier challenge
to the constitutionality of the Act by holding that the petitioners, members
of Congress, lacked standing.2 Thereafter, on several occasions, President
'5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
16 2 U.S.C. § 691b(a) (Supp. 1I 1997); id. § 691e(6) ("'[D]isapproval bill'
means a bill orjomt resolution which only disapproves one or more cancellations
of dollar amounts of discretionary budget authority, items of new direct spending,
or limited tax benefits m a special message transmitted by the President under this
subchapter ").
17 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (Presentment Clause).
18 LouIs FISHER, THE POLITICs OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXE-
CUTrVE 249 (James P Pfiffner ed., 4th ed. 1998).
9 See id.
'o See Rames v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (holding that the "case or contro-
versy" requirement of Article M was not met m an action brought by Senators
Robert C. Byrd, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Carl Levm).
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Clinton exercised his authority to cancel portions of appropriations bills,
including § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 199721 and § 968 of the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 1 These cancellations gave rise to separate
actions directly challenging the Act's constitutionality; they were
subsequently consolidated by the district court.? After mitially determinng
that both groups of plaintiffs met the standing requirements,24 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the Act violated
the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses, and inpermissibly abrogated
the separation of powers doctrme underlying the entire constitutional
framework.' The Government then sought, andthe Supreme Court granted,
expedited review of the district court's decision pursuant to the provisions
of the Act itself.26
C. The Majority Affirms: Violation of the Presentment Clause
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, foundthe Act at variance with
the "finely wrought 27 constitutional means of enacting law The Court
focused its analysis squarely upon the text of the Constitution, applying a
"formalist approach" as at least one legal commentator predicted.8 This
approach "treats the text of the Constitution and the intent of its drafters as
controlling and changed circumstances and broader policy outcomes as
irrelevantto constitutional outcomes."29 By concluding that the Actviolates
21 Cancellation No. 97-3, 62 Fed. Reg. 42,263 (1997) (cancelling § 4722(c) of
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 as an item of "new direct spending").
' Cancellation No. 97-2, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,267 (1997) (cancelling § 968 of the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 as an item of "limited tax benefit").
23 See City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F Supp. 168 (1998) (consolidating the
complaint filed by one group of plaintiffs-the City of New York, two hospital
associations, one hospital, and two umons representing health care
employees-who claimed mijury resulting from cancellation of § 4722(c) of the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, with the complaint filed by a second group of
plaintiffs-a farmers' cooperative and an individual memberthereof-who alleged
injury from the cancellation of § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997).
24 See id at 173-77
21 See id. at 177-81.
26 2 U.S.C. § 692 (Supp. 1I 1997).
27 Clinton v. City ofNew York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2104 (1998) (quoting INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
' See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Bottom Line on the Line-Item Veto Act of1996,
6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 233,239 (1997).29Id.
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the Presentment Clause, the Court did not reach the district court's further
holding that the Act also contravenes the separation of powers doctrine.
The Court believed that, by granting the President the power to "cancel
in whole" portions of bills, the Act permits nothing less than presidential
legislating. Notwithstanding that the President first signs the bill or joint
resolution into law before canceling any item, 30 the majority held that the
President was, "[i]n both legal and practical effect,"' amending and
repealingportions of laws. The Court construedthe "constitutional silence"
on this issue as "equivalent to an express prohibition."'32
The majority then turned its attention to the two primary arguments
advanced by the Government: first, that the cancellations under the Act
were the exercise of discretionary authority that the Act contemplates, and
second, that the power to cancel items is no different than the power to
decline to spend or implement tax programs.33 The Court found no merit in
either of these contentions; 34 in the end, the Court held to its narrow
conceptualization of the legislative procedures provided for by Article I,
Section 7 of the Constitution, and did not permit this deviation from that
model.
D. The Dissents
Clinton v. City ofNew York included two dissenting opinions, relevant
to the discussion insofar as they relate to the constitutionality of the Act
rather than the separate standing issue. The first, a partial dissent written
by Justice Scalia andjoined by Justice O'Connor, and Justice Breyer as to
30
"ee 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (Supp. 1I. 1997).
31 Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2103.3 1 Id. (disposing of the Government's argument that the cancellations were not
repeals by pointing out that the canceled items were rendered inoperative as to the
appellees).33 See zd. at 2105.
34 See id. at 2105-07. Fieldv. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), cited by the Govern-
ment m support of the view that not all grants of discretionary authority to the
President constitute delegations of legislative power, was distinguished by the
Court on several grounds. In that case, the President held the power to suspend
import duty exemptions, pursuant to a policy decided by Congress, whereas here
the President was repealing acts of Congress according to is own policy agendas.
Furthermore, the Court noted that in contradistinction to any of the statutes relied
upon by the Government as purported examples of the authority to decline to spend
congressionally-appropnated funds, the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 confers upon
the President the greater power of changing statutes themselves.
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Part I, takes a more expansive view of the Presentment Clause.35 To these
three Justices, who considered only the presidential cancellation of the item
in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the Act is constitutional.36
The Justices acknowledged a "technical difference" between the actual
cancellation of an item of spending and a hypothetical authorization to
"decline to spend" an item of funding in the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 17 They did not consider tins difference to have any bearing upon the
requirements of the Presentment Clause, however.3 In their view, the
ultimate issue is not whether the Presentment Clause forbids the means
employed m the Act (winch, according to tins dissenting opinion, it does
not), but rather whether the Act violates the nondelegation doctrine.39
Finding tins instance of delegation "no different from what Congress has
permitted the President to do since the formation of the Union," these
dissenting Justices effectively sknrtedthe Presentment Clause analysis used
by the majority
The second dissent was written by Justice Breyer andjomedby Justices
Scalia and O'Connor as to Part M.41 Justice Breyer began with the
proposition that the Act has the "constitutionally proper" objective of
allowmg the President to enact merely some of the items in what are
typically "massive appropriations bills.' 4 2 Justice Breyer, clearly more
deferential to tins arrangement between the legislative and executive
branches, did not accept the majority's conclusion that a cancellation under
the Act is either an amendment or repeal of a law. Justice Breyer thought
that the majority relied upon a faulty syllogism to reach its holding: the
Constitution prescribes the exclusive method of enacting or amending laws,
the Act vanes from tis method, and therefore the Act is at odds with the
Constitution.43 The error lay, in Justice Breyer's estimation, in the minor
15 See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2110-18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).36 See id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justices
Scalia and O'Connor maintained that the plaintiffs challenging the cancellation of
§ 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act lacked standing).
37See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39See id. at 2116 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice Scalia
noted, for example, that President Jefferson had been granted complete discretion to
either spend or decline to spend an appropriated sum for warships. See id. at 2117).
4' See id. at 2118-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
42Id. at 2118 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
41 See Id. at 2120 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 88
EULOGIZING THE LINE ITEM VETO AcT
premise that the Act does in fact vary from that narrowly-construed
method.44
Disposing of the majority's conclusion that the Act contravenes the
Presentment Clause, Justice Breyer reached the issue the majority did not:
whether the Act nevertheless runs afoul of separation of powers principles.
Justice Breyer's analysis embraced more diffuse notions of the boundaries
between the federal branches. He clearly abandoned formalism's stricter
approach, favored by the majority 45 Concluding that the cancellation
provision is "executive" and not "legislative" in nature, Breyer felt that
Congress neitherundermned its own authoritynor impernmssibly breached
the nondelegation doctrme.46
The belief that the title "Line Item Veto" maccurately describes the Act
was common to Justice Scalia's and Justice Breyer's dissents. For Scalia,
the Act's title is a misnomer which "succeeded in faking out the Supreme
Court."47 Likewise, Justice Breyer found that the Act does not, in literal
terms, equate to a repeal or amendment of laws."
H. NATURE OF THE DEBATE:
THE NECESSITY OF A LINE ITEM VETO
A. Introduction
Support for a presidential line item veto is perhaps more "grassroots"
in nature than the opposition raised against it. A great deal of public
enthusiasm accompamed its passage in reaction to the very real dilemmas
created by the growth of the federal budget deficit.49 As alluded to in Part
I, politicians were keenly aware of increasing public dissatisfaction with
the state of fiscal affairs. To this end, politicians were compelled to ignore
glaring defects in proposed solutions for the sake of appearing decisive to
"See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Jackson's famous concurrence
m Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 592 (1952)).
"See id. at 2123-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (devoting the bulk of these pages
of his dissent to demonstrating how the Act did not exceed the boundaries of the
nondelegation doctrine).471 Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48 See id. at 2131 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
49 See H.R. CONF REP NO. 104-11, pt. 2, at 7-8 (1995) (The House of Repre-
sentatives acknowledged that a majority of the public supported the Act by
including polling results in its report.).50See supra text accompanying note 8.
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their constituents. In contrast, much of the recent legal scholarship
accurately predicted that the item veto power, at least as expressed m its
current form, would be declared unconstitutional.5'
B. Legislating Gone Awry
The support for the item veto stems not so much from dislike of the
mechanisms established by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, but
rather from frustration with either real or perceived abuses of those
mechanisms. As noted:
The single most important factor spurring the call for item veto power has
been the persistent practice by Congress of attaching nders and other
nongermane amendments to legislation as a means to impel enactment
and avoid a veto. It appears that this problem was not foreseen by the
constitutional architects of the eighteenth century.52
The legitimate concern is with what is termed "logrolling" or "pork
barreling," whereby members of Congress progressively fatten appropria-
tions bills with their own expenditure items. These expenditures invariably
have a local flavor, and give rise to the arrangements under which mem-
bers consent to each other's additions. Appropriation bills receiving this
treatment emerge as "omnibus" legislation comprised of "assorted
legislation grouped together and presented in a single bill or resolu-
tion."'
Proponents of the line item veto readily point to the simultaneous rise
in special-interest groups and private lobbying as underlying reasons for
the burgeoning pork barrel phenomenon. Justifiably or not, the public
thinks Congress has succumbed to these pressures. The desire to be
5 See, e.g., Catherine M. Lee, Note, The Constitutionality ofthe Line Item Veto
Act of 1996. Three Potential Sources for Presidential Line Item Veto Power, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 119 (1997); Gerhardt, supra note 28, at 233; Paul R.Q.
Wolfson, Note, Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.J. 838
(1987). These excellent sources outline, m detail, the constitutional shortcomings
of various possible forms of the line item veto and go far beyond the necessarily
limited scope of this Note.
52 ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO: TOUCHSTONE OF THE PRESI-
DENCY 124 (1988).
1 Diane-Michele Krasnow, Note, The Imbalance ofPower and the Presiden-
tial Veto: A Case for the Item Veto, 14 HARv J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583, 584 n.6
(1991).
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reelected necessitates great sums of campaign money, money most easily
obtained from special interest contributors. This flurry of congressional
fundraismg activity, wholly separate from the legislative duties members
are elected to perform, is problematic. One commentator, discussing
perceived changes m the separation of powers between the President and
Congress, has identified what he terms "fudged legislation"
Since the early 1960s there has been a proliferation and mobilization of
interest groups and policy networks, both those favoring and those
opposing various forms of government activism. At the same time,
legislativepower m Congress has become more decentralized mthe hands
of congressmen whose political careers owe little to their party and almost
everything to their personal campaign organizations and fund-raising
capacities. The result has been an increase in the range of contending
groups and in the number of available veto points, and an every-man-for-
himself mentality in the legislative process. In order for anything to pass
in this situation, legislation typically has to be "fudged," embodying a
host of concessions that render the statute ambiguous if not contradictory
on key points in order to assemble the unpredictable votes and pass
through numerous roadblocks.'
In the midst of so much frenzied congressional fundraismg, proponents
contend, the coherence and logic necessary for budgetary planning cannot
exist. Fiscal irresponsibility rises to ever-greater heights (or lows,
depending upon one's vantage point), while the nation as a whole suffers
the ongoing consequences. This view presupposes an inherent defect m
Congress, principally that members lack the requisite will to restrain their
inclinations.5 Assuming that members are deficient m this regard, it still
must be shown that the President possesses this restraint.
Item veto advocates express the belief that omnibus legislation
seriously infringes upon the President's normal veto powers. As such, the
curative measures of the line item are needed.56 The current state of affairs,
' Hugo Heclo, What Has Happened to the Separation of Powers?, in SEP-
ARATION OF POWERS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 131, 146 (Bradford P Wilson &
Peter W Schramm eds., 1994) (discussing the gradual overlapping of these
powers).
55 See Gerhardt, supra note 28, at 235 n. 12 (citing a statement of Senator Dixon
appearing in 135 CONG. REC. S911 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989)).56 See, e.g., Judith A. Best, The Item Veto: Would the Founders Approve?, 14
PRES. STUD. Q. 183 (1984) (cited in SPITZER, supra note 52, at 123).
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so the argument goes, "has turned the tables on the executive making the
veto work for legislative license instead of against it."57 Presidents often
findthemselves confrontedwith the lose-lose choice ofvetomgneeded and
popular appropriations legislation because of the attachment ofporkbarrel
riders, or alternatively, of signing the appropriations bill into law despite
its flaws.5 8 Tis scenario may even become an ultimatum of sorts,
confronting the hapless President with the risk of creating a complete
budgetary impasse and halting government.59
C. Historical Context of the Item Veto Concept
Despite what the recent clamor for the item veto leads one to believe,
the item veto concept is far from new. Adherents to the line item veto idea,
no less than its critics, ostensibly find authority m the Framers' discussions
about the balance ofpower between the executive and legislative branches.
Both sides have examined, m great depth, the historical documents for an
answer to the question of whether the Framers would have approved.60
Illustrative of tls debate, it has been suggested, on one hand, that the
"opaque" language pertaining to the executive veto power reflects the
Framers' desire to enable the President to confront situations not then
foreseen.61 Conversely, the constitutional silence on the item veto has been
interpreted as indicating a desire that the President rarely veto appropria-
tions bills, and not as proof that the Framers were unfamiliar with omnibus
appropriations.62 The majority in Clinton v. City of New York sided with the
nay-sayers when it considered the constitutional silence as tantamount to
an express prohibition on this authority 63
D. Delegation or Impoundment?
Both sides of the item veto debate have valid concerns about the
seemingly unchecked attachment of riders to appropriations measures.
57Id. at 188 (cited in SPITZER, supra note 52, at 123)
58 See id. at 187 (cited m SPITZER, supra note 52, at 123).
59See L. Gordon Crovitz, The Line Item Veto: The Best Response When Con-
gress Passes One Spending "Bill" a Year, 18 PEPP L. REv 43, 46-48 (1991).
6 See, e.g., Best, supra note 56, at 183 (arguing that the Framers would support
an item veto to correct legislative "encroachmenf' on the presidential veto). Butsee
Wolfson, supra note 51, at 840 (viewing the idea that the Framers would approve
of-an item veto to correct Congressional abuse as "flawed").
l See Krasnow, supra note 53, at 595.
62See Wolfson, supra note 51, at 839-41.
63 Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2103 (1998).
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Indeed, few, if any, would champion the budgetary status quo. Advo-
cates recognize the need to bolster their arguments by analogizing to
currently accepted (or at least tolerated) practices. They seek to lend
credibility to the item veto by holding it out as either (1) a permis-
sible congressional delegation of discretionary budget authority to the
President,' or (2) as a manifestation of the President's acknowledged
power to decline to spend (or to impound) appropriated funds." Al-
though the Government did not prevail under these arguments in
Clinton v. City of New York, proponents maintain that clothing modi-
fied item veto legislation in either of these two raiments is nonetheless
possible.
1. Delegation
Approaching the delegation issue first, two precepts emerge. One is
obvious to the most casual observer of the law or federal government: the
Constitution vests the legislative power m the Congress"l and the executive
power m the President.67 The other is more intuitive: as a practical matter,
even a legislative body as large and diverse as Congress cannot devote its
attention to all matters properly falling beneath the legislative "umbrella."
Congress, either reluctantly or gleefully, but nonetheless routinely,
delegates decision making powers to entities outside of itself.6 Members
of Congress are no less immune than other citizens to the increasing
complexity of our world, and consequently wish to delegate responsibility
whenever feasible.6 9 Delegation to a technical or scientific administration
may be sensible m light of the specialized knowledge required for
particular decision making. Delegation m another setting, however, maybe
ill-advised, if not blatantly unconstitutional. Congressional delegations
have been made to adminstrative agencies, independent commissions, and
even to the President directly70 On the judicial side, two delegation
doctrine issues have weighed heavily upon the Supreme Court: first,
whether delegation is ever possible (which as a settled matter it generally
I See infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text
6 See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
6See generally U.S. CONsT. art. I.
67 See generally id. art. II.
61 See Heclo, supra note 54, at 138.
69 See id. at 136-37
71 See d. at 138.
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appears to be),7" and second, whether it is excessive or uncontrolled m any
given instance.72
The Supreme Court's pronouncements onthe boundaries ofdelegation,
however, have not always been clear or consistent.73 At least one commen-
tator posits that the Court is retreating from the stricter standard
(disfavoring delegation) it establishednot too many years ago.74 If accurate,
supporters of an item veto power would regard the move as wise judicial
policy Arguably, loosening the strictures surrounding the legislative
function allows for more expedient handling of issues such as federal
budgetary crises. Justice Jackson's famous concurrence m Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawye?5 lends nnplicit ideological support to an item
veto power. Indeed, dissenting Justice Breyer quoted this concurrence in
Clinton v. City of New York: "Presidential powers are not fixed but
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress."76
Critics reply to this delegation argument by noting that the President
performs a legislative function when he or she expunges parts of appropna-
tions bills through the "cancellation" device.' This manner of delegation
therefore confers more than the authority to analyze a particular fact
situation and then apply the result mandated by Congress as per the
guidelines of its delegation.78 Instead, it is the much broader ability to
71 See Wolfson, supra note 51, at 846 n.44 (noting that any allowable delegation
of authority by Congress must, at a nuinum, contain sufficient standards or
principles by wlch to guide the agency in its decisions).
7 See id.
7See id. at 848.
7 See Heclo, supra note 54, at 142. Heclo compares cases such as INS v.
Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) with Morrson v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), and
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Heclo sees these later cases as
evidencing the Supreme Court's amenability to a more "pragmatic approach that
accepts the political reality of overlapping powers." Heclo, supra note 54, at 142.
1 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 592 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
76 Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct 2091, 2120 (1998) (quoting
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
' See Lee, supra note 51, at 143 (arguing that the President is, in effect,
legislating independently).
78 See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). The Government in Clinton v.
City ofNew York relied heavily upon Field v. Clark, arguing that the Line Item
Veto Act of 1996 was indistinguishable from the type of delegation in that case.
See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2105-07 The Tariff Act of 1890, at issue in Field v.
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unilaterally brush aside appropriations items with which the President
disagrees and, in the process, to substitute his or her own policy agendas.79
2. Impoundment
Alternatively, and distinct from the delegation doctrine argument, is the
contention that an item veto represents nothing more than an extension or
modification of the President's traditionally exercised power to decline to
spend appropriations items. This is known in constitutional law parlance
as the "impoundment doctrne."80 The President's refusal to spend funds is
not rooted in any explicit constitutional provision, but in fact is held up as
an abuse of those provisions.81 Beginning with President Thomas Jefferson
m 1803,2 and increasing in both frequency and degree through a progres-
sion of Presidents during tins century,13 impoundment attained almost
unquestioned legitimacy before its curtailment due to overuse during the
Nixon presidency 84 This practice, however, is by no means extinct.
To those who favor an item veto, the allure of the impoundment
doctrine is inescapable; after all, it achieves largely the same result as an
item veto. In both instances the President surveys the budgetary situation
Clark, allowed the President to suspend tariff exemptions on specified items when
it appeared to him that the country from which these products had originated was
unposmg unreasonable import duties on American agricultural products. The
Clinton Court found these situations distinguishable, however, because while the
TariffAct of 1890 allowed only the suspension of a statutory exemption, the Line
Item Veto Act of 1996 permitted the cancellation of whole parts of appropriations
bills themselves. See id.
7 9 See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2106.
8 0 OTIS H. STEPHENS & GREGORY J. RATHJEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ALLOCATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER275 (1980) ("Impoundment consists of
the presidential practice of withholding or refusing to allow the expenditure of
certain momes appropriated by Congress.").
' See ld.
2See id. at 275-76 (relating how President Jefferson withheld momes Congress
had designated for warshps, upon a change in circumstances which obviated the
need for those warships).
83 See id at 276 (President Franklin D. Roosevelt frequently spent sums below
what Congress had allocated. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson also
used this practice.).
84 See id. ("Nixon, however, extended the impoundment power beyond accept-
able limits and did so for clear policy purposes; his actions gave rise to efforts




and then effectively withholds funds. Affection for the impoundment
doctrine is not unqualified, however, because of the attending risks of
judicial intervention and public outcry It is simply too easy for critics to
cry foul when the President acts so unilaterally Because impoundment
owes its continuing existence to congressional acquiescence mthe practice,
it seems a rather tenuous foundation upon which to predicate item veto
authority
It is true that many Presidents have requested an item veto power, and
this fact has, in turn, added to the popularity of the idea over time."
Illustrating this popularity, many states have item vetoes which operate at
the state level of government.8 6 Although these gubernatorial item vetoes
provide convenient comparative models, they are not wholly applicable to
the federal government.8 7 In fact, the analogy between Congress and state
legislatures is poor. 8 Despite the persuasiveness of these contentions, they
cannot justify an item veto if it contravenes the federal Constitution. The
Court in Clinton v. City ofNew York held that the line item veto, at least m
the form represented by the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, fails under the
Presentment Clause.89
III. WHY THE PRESIDENT?:
UTILITY AND WISDOM OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGISLATING
A. Introduction
Amid the flood of scholarship examining the constitutionality of the
item veto power, the fundamental question "why the President?" has
received comparatively scant attention. Indeed, the Supreme Court avoided
this ideological minefield with the terse statement that "[t]he Court
expresses no opinion about the wisdom of the Act's procedures and does
not lightly conclude that the actions of the Congress that passed it, and the
1s See SPITZER, supra note 52, at 126-29 (naming President Ulysses S. Grant as
the first to publicly request an item veto).
86 See id. at 134-38. Spitzer explores states' experiences with the gubernatorial
item veto and identifies several shortcomings. After showing how operations at a
state level do not translate so easily to the federal level, he predicts negative effects
of an item veto far beyond its intended reach. Spitzer's main contention is that the
gubernatorial item veto undesirably strengthens the governor's position to the
detriment of the legislature.
17 See id.
88 See FISHER, supra note 18, at 245.
89See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
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President who signed it into law, were unconstitutional." Although it
would be surpnsmg if the Supreme Court instituted the practice of freely
commenting upon the (mis)behavior of its coordinate branches of
government, here the Court couldhave more fully elucidated its reasoning.
The final analysis inquires into the premise which breathes life into the
whole notion of the item veto: that the President stands in a better position
than Congress to make difficult budgetary decisions and therefore ought to
have more control. Even those proponents of the item veto motivated
exclusively out of animosity toward Capitol Hill cannot escape the need to
defendtheir own policy Tins can only be done by contrasting the supposed
nature of Congress with that of a President. As discussed more fully below,
if the President suffers from the same fiscal infirmities which afflict
Congress, little may be gained from the item veto.
B. The President's Influence on the Federal Budget
The burden of showing the merit of change falls upon those seeking the
change. Proponents of the Act would be remiss m failing to note that the
President already assists in formulating the federal budget." The President
currently sends Congress a suggested list of the amount to be spent and the
manner in which to raise it.9 Tns function is advisory, of course, but it
does carry political weight. This is especially true when a majority of
Congress is from the President's party The President's oversight on
budgetary issues has been described as "dominant," when viewed from the
practical perspective ofreal mfluence.93 Carrying this idea one step further,
however, to allow presidential 'legislating' by means of an item veto
should not be taken lightly.
One commentator on politics and the law has discussed the so-called
"unwritten constitution," and identified it as a major current in national
events:
The roots of the incoherence of policy which lead many critics to wish to
amend the U.S. Constitution do not come from the Constitution but rather
from the unwritten constitution-the fixed political customs that have
90 Id. at 2094.
91 See Louis FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRimNDS: CONGRESS, THE
PREsIDENT, AND THE LAw 169 (1978).
92 See id. at 169-71 ("The president formulates budget estimates and submits
them to Congress in accordance with the Budget and Accounting Act.").
93See SPITZER, supra note 52, at 139.
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developed without formal Constitutional amendment, but that have been
authorized by statute or frozen, at least temporarily, m tradition.94
Politicking remains politicking, and the best practitioners of the art are
those who effectively utilize the "power bases" which influence the public
and fellow politicians alike. Television speeches and party platforms, for
example, encapsulate grand ideas into sinplistic slogans and are potent
tools in the budgetary area. It is not an overstatement to suggest that a
popular President may achieve the same result as a line item cancellation
by snply speaking out against the not-yet finalized bill. If tis is true, why
not legitimize this ability in statutory terms? Is it not wiser, so the
argument goes, to concede the realities of the political landscape and
openly permit this type of delegation? One commentator, writing in a
different context, suggests that we as a nation "quit talking about the
Constitutional separation ofpowers" and recognize that "in all major issues
of management and policy the Congress and the President are jointly
involved in the direction and control of the departments and agencies."' 95 A
literal application of that idea, however unlikely, might have unforeseen
consequences beyond the scope of this Note.
C. Utility ofIndividual Leadership
The institution of the presidency has witnessed profound changes.
These changes have outpaced any comparable changes in the Congress.
Quite possibly, the presidency is no longer the institution the Framers
envisioned. Its rise in prominence from more humble beginnings has been
meteoric. While the earliest Presidents often found themselves performing
"chores" for Congress,9 a modem President is a celebrity of sorts and, even
on occasion, the focal point for our national aspirations. 97 Presidents, in
many instances, are "expected to be the nation's leading agenda setters,
94 DON K. PRICE, AMERICA'S UNWRrrrEN CONSTITUTION: SCIENCE, RELIGION,
AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 9 (1983) (noting price lists, party conventions,
congressional committees, and press conferences as various manifestations of the
"unwritten constitution").
95 Id. at 135-36.
96 See Heclo, supra note 54, at 137 (arguing that the presidency was formerly
more of an assistant position to Congress).
97 See HENRY J. MERRY, FIVE-BRANCH GOVERNMENT: THE FULL MEASURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CHECKS AND BALANCES 91 (1980) (quoting JAMES D. BARBER,
THEPRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE INTHEWHITE HOUSE
(1977)).
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policy initiators, problem solvers, and all-around leaders with a 'vision.' "98
This phenomenon is attributable to, or even demanded by, the exponential
rate of change and increasing complexity in our world.9
Whether or not the ascendancy of the presidency was inevitable, there
is a subtle appeal to leadership by a single individual. Direct leadership by
an involved and proactive Chief Executive adjures to our national
character. i°° Concededly, it is more possible to hold the President mdividu-
ally accountable than it is to browbeat a representative body comprised of
many constantly changing parts. Superficially, at least, this counsels in
favor of a broader presidential budgetary authority
A President, whether wise or misguided, presents an image quite unlike
that of Congress. The workings of Congress no doubt remain a jumbled
mystery to manyAmencans. At times, Congress resembles a feuding house
divided against itself and mcapable of sustained initiative. But Presidents,
after all, are merely individuals. Hated or loved, an individual is at least
predictable and describable. A President has a style which will be used to
structure future decision making. 01 Ultimately, these truths underlie much
ofthe support for placing an item veto power in the hands of one individual.
D. Congress's Retreat from Responsibility
A skeptic might view an item veto simply as Congress's abdication of
its spending authority in the face of pronounced voter discontent. This
notion has been stated aptly, and colorfully-
No matter how much the members of Congress want to strap themselves
to the mast of budgetary restraint in the form of delegated responsibility
to another branch m the hopes of avoiding the siren songs of special
interests, the real siren that they should avoid is the one calling for
abdicating their umque constitutional responsibility and thereby avoiding
political accountability for not making the hard choices 102
Delegation, once done, is hard to undo. This observation cautions against
allowing Congress to slough offwhat is essentially its primary function and
9i Heclo, supra note 54, at 136.
See id. at 1371
"o See MERRY, supra note 97, at 90-91.
1Ol See James David Barber, Presidential Character and How to Foresee It, in
THE PRESIDENCY IN CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 60-61 (Norman C. Thomas ed.,
1975).
102 Gerhardt, supra note 28, at 234.
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power to a co-equal branch of government. A Congress partially relieved
of its "power of the purse" by an item veto appears superfluous at best. As
a further consequence, the presidency is elevated to a level beyond which
it was intended to rise. Repeating the view of another, it is best that "clear
bright lines"'' 3 remain drawn between the President and Congress. Indeed,
one scholar has envisioned grave constitutional consequences, including a
"radical restructuring of constitutional power,""' emerging from a reform
as ostensibly innocuous as the line item veto.
Does the President actually require congressional delegation to both
achieve accountability as President and advance the cause of national
policy in general?'05 This seems unlikely, given that Presidents already
command such a central role in the national political consciousness. One
scholar voices the opinion that, "[t]o a ludicrous degree, Americans are
governedby presidential instincts, whims, idiosyncracies, ormind-sets."1°
Presidential opinions in many instances become the de facto national
policy Swinging the pendulum so far in the direction of the President
would inevitably lead to calls for the restoration of Congress's abandoned
authority
E. Are the President and Congress Really So Different?
The realization that the President does not operate in apolitical vacuum
lessens the seductiveness of the item veto. The President is merely one of
the more prominent performers on the stage of public discourse and
opinion. A President's desire to leave a permanent imprint upon the office,
and secure a favorable legacy, guarantees that all actions will be taken in
full consideration of their impact on popularity ratings.
Admittedly, one difference between members of Congress and the
President is that a President has a national rather than local constituency
In INS v. Chadha,°7 the Court struck the so-called "one house legislative
veto." In that opinion, the majority repeated its statement in an earlier
decision that "it maybe, at some times, on some subjects, that the President
elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are
the members of either body of the Legislature. '0 This broader constitu-
03 Heclo, supra note 54, at 139.
104 FISHER, supra note 18, at 24705 See SPITZER, supra note 52, at 132.
'0 CHARLES M. HARDIN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY:
TOWARD A NEW CONSTITUTION 21 (1974).
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982).
'
0 8 Id. at 2783 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926)).
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ency does not mean, however, that a President lacks the incentive to favor
particular local projects:
There can be no doubt of the president's interest in pork barreling,
distributive legislation, and m the patronage system m general. Like any
elected official, the president has an obvious stake in electoral/popular
support as well as support in Congress. Pork barrel projects can be
extremely important in appealing to both of these constituencies.' 9
Special interest groups and campaign contributors do not stop at Capitol
Hill, but continue on to the White House. Granting the President the item
veto merely shifts more of this undue influence in his or her direction.
Artful use of an item veto power is not restricted to merely canceling
appropriations items m the intended fashion.' 0 The preemptive threat of its
use "could force legislators to scale back the size of a program""' and
thereby produce the desired budget reduction. Before proponents applaud
this result, however, the potential downside is far greater and perhaps far
more likely as well. Collusion between the President and Congress may in
fact increase the federal budget.12 This easily-inagmed scenario occurs
where the President agrees to spare appropriations from an item veto m
return for congressional votes for one of the President's own expenditure
programs."' Rather than taming Congress, the item veto provides the
President with an even more potent means of arm-twisting. It has been
noted that "[the most plausible result [of the item veto] would be a
reduction m pork for the President's foes but an increase for his allies." 4
In practical terms, although the item veto preserves both the presidential
veto and congressional power to override that veto, the likelihood of
Congress mustering the necessary congressional votes decreases because
the passage of an entire bill is not at stake. The consensus-building needed
to pass the excised appropriations is unlikely to materialize where the
interests involved have been narrowed.
IV CONCLUSION
Congress is perhaps forever tainted with the stigma of being a fiscal
nsmanager. Tins label is unfortunate, and not totally deserved. One
109 SPITZER, supra note 52, at 132 (citation omitted).
"
0 See FISHER, supra note 18, at 243.
" Id. at 247
1 2 See id.
" 
3 See id.
114 SPITzER, supra note 52, at 134.
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observer feels Congress, as much as anything else, "has taken a 'bum rap'
m the persistent accusations leveled by presidents and others that it is a
spendthrift."1 ' He notes that"[u]p until 1980, most of the nation's debt had
accumulated because of war. Add to that presidential spending initiatives,
and one is left with the conclusion that Congress's pnncipal sm has been
going along with the President." 16 It seems anomalous to singularly
apportion blame to the legislative branch of government for so large a
problem.
Many factors interact overtime to give rise to federal budgetary crises.
Undoubtedly, some reasons have yet to be identified, much less under-
stood. But giving the President the ability to 'supervise' Congress's
expenditures is a doubtful method of correcting longstanding and immense
fiscal problems. If anything, practical experience shows that expedient
solutions rarely prove either effective or predictable in outcome. What is
needed is a more earnest commitment from all sides of the federal
government, and by Americans in general, to prioritize appropriations and
exercise restraint. For their part, voters should not condition the reelection
of their representatives upon the amount of local appropriations obtained.
The item veto concept is as much predicated upon a false conceptual-
ization of the presidency as upon negative views of Congress. Otherwise,
solutions would focus upon Congress rather than on the interactions of
Congress with the President. The argument that an item veto is needed for
"presidential self-defense and [as] a protection against the enactment of ill-
conceived legislation"' 17 is pretextual because it is only seriously raised in
the debate about the budget deficit. Regardless of whether the presidential
veto has lost some of its practical usefulness, by no means has the
presidency been subordinated to Congress.
Supporters of the line item veto fall short of proving either its wisdom
or its ability to perform the function for which it was intended. Setting
aside the constitutional deficiencies of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996,
proponents have performed only half of the necessary analysis. More than
simply condemning Congress for its demonstrated inability to balance the
federal budget, proponents must justify the premise that the President
stands in a better position to make the difficult, but needed, budgetary
decisions. This they have not done, and ultimately are unable to do.
15 Id. at 141.
116 Id.
17 Krasnow, supra note 53, at 613.
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